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Multistrategy evolutionary games are studied on a square lattice when the pair interactions are composed of
coordinations between strategy pairs and an additional term with self-dependent payoff. We describe a method
for determining the strength of each elementary coordination component in n-strategy potential games. Using
analytical and numerical methods, the presence and absence of Ising-type order-disorder phase transitions are
studied when a single pair coordination is extended by some types of self-dependent elementary games. We also
introduce noise-dependent three-strategy equivalents of the n-strategy elementary coordination games.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In multiagent evolutionary games [1–4] the players are
located on the sites of a lattice or graph, play two-player games
with their nearest neighbors, and are allowed to change their
strategies by following a dynamical rule based on their payoffs.
It is already clarified that the resulting stationary state depends
on the number of strategies, the payoff matrix, the dynamical
rule, and the connectivity structures defining the interacting
pairs. Until now the systematic analysis of the possible
stationary states was limited to two-strategy systems because
for n strategies the number of payoff parameters increases
with n2. The concept of matrix decomposition [5–8], however,
provides an efficient way to explore possible behaviors in the
whole space of payoff parameters. In this approach the payoff
matrix is built up as a linear combination of orthogonal basis
matrices representing four types of interactions: coordination,
self-dependence, cross dependence, and cyclic dominance.
Within these types of interactions there are games that can be
transformed into each other by relabeling the strategies. These
inherent symmetries imply equivalent behavior in different
regions of the parameters and significantly reduce the effort
necessary to explore the possible system behaviors as a
function of payoff parameters.
Such an anatomy of matrix interactions becomes fruitful if
it provides deep insight into how evolutionary games behave,
how their strategy distributions evolve, what spatial structures
emerge during this evolution, whether they possess phase
transitions, etc. The first steps of this systematic approach
imply studying the general behavior of a macroscopic
system if the pair interactions are described by the simplest
basis games. It is known [8], for example, that multiagent
evolutionary games (on a lattice or regular graph) can be
exactly described by the behavior of a single player if the
uniform pair interaction is defined as a linear combination
of self- and cross-dependent components if the logit rule
controls strategy updates [8–13]. Among potential games,
realistic pair interactions are represented by the class of
coordination games. The effects of increasing the number
of strategies in elementary coordination games have already
been investigated [14]. In the spirit of the above-mentioned
exploration process, our analysis will now be focused on
potential games composed of an elementary coordination-type
game and additional games with self-dependent payoffs. Our
recent research aims to clarify the interplay between these two
elementary interactions. This bottom-up approach can shine a
light on general relationships and universal features that also
occur in well-investigated physical systems.
The coordination-type interaction is already present among
symmetric two-strategy games and it represents systems that
are equivalent to widely studied Ising-type models [15,16]
(which crop up in research fields ranging from magnetism to
biology to sociophysics [17–24]) and exhibit similar thermo-
dynamic behavior if the logit rule controls strategy updates
[8–13]. In the original coordination game [25–29] the two
players independently choose one of two strategies and they
are paid 1 (unit of payoff) if they both have chosen the
same option and lose 1 otherwise. Similar coordination-type
interactions can be found among the 2 × 2 subgames of
certain n-strategy games where the players are restricted
to use only their ith and j th strategies (1  i < j  n). In
the corresponding elementary coordination games all the
other payoff components are zero. Evidently, elementary
coordination games with another strategy pair (e.g., i ′ and
j ′) exhibit the same behavior (noise dependence for the
logit rule) on any graph. The analysis of these systems on a
square lattice has revealed [14] that a continuous (Ising-type)
order-disorder phase transition can be observed when the
noise level is increased if n is less than a threshold value
(n < nth). Otherwise, this system undergoes a first-order
phase transition at a critical noise level Kc(n) that vanishes as
Kc(n)  2/ ln n if n → ∞.
It will be shown that the addition of a self-dependent
component to elementary coordination games on a square
lattice can change the order of, and even abolish, the order-
disorder phase transition. In Sec. II we give a detailed
overview of the models studied. Section III introduces the
methods we use to study these models and presents our
results. Section IV establishes the equivalence between an
n-strategy elementary coordination game and a three-strategy
elementary coordination game combined with suitably chosen
noise-level-dependent self-dependent components. Finally, in
Sec. V we summarize our main conclusions.
II. MODELS AND GENERAL FEATURES
We consider spatial evolutionary games played by equiva-
lent players who are located on theN = L × L sites of a square
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lattice with periodic boundary conditions [2,4,8]. Each player
x can choose one of n pure strategies sx , which are usually
denoted by the n-dimensional Cartesian unit vectors. In other
words, the ith strategy (i = 1,2, . . . ,n) will be denoted by the
ith unit vector. Using this formalism, the income of the player
located on site x is given by
u˜x(sx) =
∑
δ
sx · Asx+δ, (1)
where the summation runs over the nearest neighbors located
at sites x + δ and the payoffs are defined by an n × n matrix
A [2].
In the following we will consider combinations of two types
of basis games. Namely, a coordination-type game with a unit
strength is perturbed by one or two additional self-dependent
components with adjustable strength. All these symmetric
two-player games are potential games and their corresponding
potential matrix V can be determined [8]. The total potential
of the whole multiplayer system is given by
U (s) = 1
2
∑
x,δ
sx · Vsx+δ, (2)
when the individual players’ strategies are defined by the
strategy profile s = {sx}. This potential U (s) plays the role
of the negative potential energy in Ising-type models and it
summarizes the individual incentives of the active players for
consecutive unilateral strategy changes, namely, if player x
changes strategy from sx to s′x then
u˜x(sx) − u˜x(s′x) = U (s) − U (s′), (3)
where sy = s′y for all y = x in the strategy profiles s and s′.
In the present systems the players revise their strategies in
random sequential order following the logit rule, according to
which a randomly selected player x changes strategy to s′x with
a probability
w(s′x) =
eu˜x (s
′
x )/K∑
sx
eu˜x (sx )/K
. (4)
This update rule exponentially favors higher individual in-
come under the assumption that the strategy profile remains
unchanged in the player’s neighborhood [12,30–33]. The
parameter K quantifies the uniform strength of noises (a
player’s perception and decision making can both be imperfect,
i.e., noisy) present in the system. A system governed by
this evolutionary rule evolves into the Boltzmann distribution
[9,34] in which the probability p(s) of finding the system in
strategy profile s is determined by the following expression:
p(s) = e
U (s)/K∑
s′ e
U (s′)/K . (5)
All coordination-type interactions [6] can be composed
of elementary coordination games that are defined by the
payoff matrices d(p,q; n) and express Ising-type coordination
between the strategies p and q (p < q), namely,
dij (p,q; n) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 for i = j = p
1 for i = j = q
−1 for i = p, j = q
−1 for i = q,j = p
0 otherwise.
(6)
A linear combination of these elementary components takes
the form [35]
A(coord) =
∑
1p<qn
αpqd(p,q; n)
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
β1 −α12 · · · −α1n
−α12 β2 · · · −α2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−αn1 −αn2 · · · βn
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (7)
and defines a general coordination-type game. Notice that in
this combination the strength of each elementary d(p,q; n)
component is directly given by the corresponding off-diagonal
element of A(coord), while the matrix’s diagonal elements are
βp =
∑
q =p αpq =
∑
q =p αqp because the sum of payoffs is
zero in each row and column. It is worth noting that Eq. (7)
gives us a method to determine the strength of each elementary
coordination game in a payoff matrix A after separating the
coordination-type interactions [7,8].
The class of general coordination-type games also contains
games that actually lead to anticoordinated spatial strategy
distributions [7], e.g., an elementary coordination game with
negative strength. In “real” coordination games the maximal
value of Aij is located in the main diagonal of the payoff
matrix [e.g., max (Aij ) = β1] and the corresponding strategy
forms a homogeneous phase at low noise levels that varies
smoothly towards the disordered phase if K is increased.
In general, the (Ising- or Potts-type) equivalence of two (or
more) homogeneous states is eliminated by varying the values
of αpq . On the other hand, if max (Aij ) = −αpq we get an
anticoordination game in which the strategy pair (p,q) can
form two equivalent sublattice ordered strategy arrangements
(at low noise levels on a square lattice), reminiscent of an
antiferromagnetic spin system. Similar strategy distributions
can also occur on other bipartite lattices or graphs as well.
Such antiferromagnetic systems are in fact equivalent to
ferromagnetic ones, as exchanging the labels p and q on one of
the sublattices transforms anticoordination into coordination
and vice versa [15]. The anticoordinated systems always pos-
sess Ising-type critical phase transitions because the twofold
degenerated ground state is preserved by the application of a
homogeneous magnetic field (or self-dependent components
detailed below) if its strength does not exceed a threshold value
[36–39]. Similar behavior is expected for n > 2.
Self-dependent game components can in general represent
subsidies or taxes, depending on their effect on player
income. The linear combinations of these types of interactions
are represented by matrices A(self) composed of rows with
homogeneous payoffs, that is, A(self)ij = hi . The corresponding
elementary game components are described by the following
payoff matrices:
eij (p; n) =
{
1 for i = p
0 otherwise. (8)
In this formalism the self-dependent games can be defined as
A(self) =
n∑
p=1
hpe(p; n). (9)
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It is noteworthy that the all 1 component belongs to this subset
of games and represents an irrelevant term [8]. Here the roles
of hj resemble the external fields in Potts models [40]. It is
known that the potential matrix of self-dependent games is
V(self) = A(self) + A(self)T (the index T refers to transposition)
[8].
The solution of a spatial evolutionary game made up only
of self-dependent components A = A(self) can be reduced to
a one-site problem because the players’ payoffs are solely
defined by their own strategy choices. For example, in the
logit-rule-driven evolutionary game defined by A = h1e(1; n)
the equilibrium strategy frequencies on a square lattice are
given by Eq. (5) as
ρ1 = e
4h1/K
e4h1/K + (n − 1) , (10)
ρp = 1
e4h1/K + (n − 1) for p > 1.
The prefactor 4 in the exponent corresponds to the number of
nearest neighbors in the square lattice.
Now we study the effect of adding self-dependent game
components to the aforementioned coordination-type inter-
action defined by Eq. (6) while preserving the equivalence
of the n − 2 neutral strategies. More quantitatively, we study
evolutionary games defined by the payoff matrices
A′ = d(1,2; n) + h′e(1; n), (11)
A′′ = d(1,2; n) + h′′[e(1; n) + e(2; n)]. (12)
In the previous notation the interaction of A′ includes a self-
dependent component with h1 = h′ and hp = 0 if p > 1 and
with A′′ h1 = h2 = h′′ and hp = 0 if p > 2. Evidently, the
system with h1 = 0, h2 = h′, and hp = 0 for p > 2 can be
mapped onto A′ by exchanging the strategy labels 1 and 2.
The game of A′′ has two equivalent preferred Nash equi-
libria as both the coordination and self-dependent components
favor strategy 1 or 2 equally. In lattice systems this interaction
results in a homogeneous state of strategy 1 (or 2) in the
zero noise limit and an order-disorder phase transition is
expected when K is increased. This Ising-type critical phase
transition is generally quantified by the variation of an order
parameter m = ρ1 − ρ2, where ρi measures the frequency
of strategy i in the whole system. For h′′ = 0 the previous
analyses [14] have indicated that m = 0 above the critical
noise level (K > Kc), while ρi = ρj if 2 < i < j  n and
all ρi go to 1/n if K → ∞. Due to the identical symmetries
similar behavior is expected at a critical noise level dependent
on the value of h′′ = 0. Notice, furthermore, that the effect
of this interaction A′′ is equivalent to the one where the
self-dependent components are increased by a constant value
(A(self)ij → A(self)ij + c) that may even be chosen as c = −h′′.
The latter model has a self-dependent component supporting
or suppressing the neutral strategies equally.
If the interaction is given by A′ then the self-dependent
component favors strategy 1 (2) if h′ > 0 (h′ < 0). This
type of self-dependent interaction smooths out the critical
phase transition in a way resembling the effect of an external
magnetic field in the two-dimensional Ising model.
III. METHODS AND RESULTS
Cluster variation methods (for details see [8,41–43]) deter-
mine the equilibrium configuration probabilities (5) by finding
the extremal values of a thermodynamic potential, in our case
 = U + KS, (13)
where U and S are the average value of the potential
[U =∑s p(s)U (s)] and entropy [S = −∑s p(s) ln p(s)], re-
spectively. The mean-field approximation (MFA) and pair
approximation (PA) methods use one-site probabilitiesp1(i) =
ρi of finding strategy i at any site (on the translation invariant
lattice) and two-site configuration probabilities p2(i,j ) of
finding the strategy pair (i,j ) on two neighboring sites to
approximate the aforementioned thermodynamic potential.
The numerical solutions of the MFAs and PAs are presented
in Fig. 1 for several parameters if the interactions are defined
by the payoff matrix A′′. In general, these results show
FIG. 1. Strategy frequencies as a function of K for n = 5 and
h′′ = −2/3, −1/3, 0, and 1/3 [plotted with black, blue (dark gray),
green (medium gray), and orange (light gray) lines, respectively]
in the model defined by the payoff matrix (12). The lines denote
solutions of the (a) MFA and (b) PA, with thick and thin lines
corresponding to stable and unstable states respectively. Solid and
dashed lines belong to the two coordinated strategies and dash-dotted
lines represent neutral strategies. The vertical lines indicate first-order
phase transitions. The unstable solution of the PA at h′′ = −2/3 is
covered by the other plots.
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qualitatively similar predictions for the equilibrium properties
of the system and the MFA predicts higher critical transition
points in comparison with those found by PAs. We have to
emphasize that both the MFA and PA predict a disordered
state of the neutral strategies, with ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 and ρ3 =
ρ4 = ρ5 = 1/3, in the low noise limit for low enough values of
h′′, namely, if h′′ < 0. Notice, furthermore, that the unstable
solutions of the MFA reserve the symmetry ρ1 = ρ2, which
eliminates the contributions of d(1,2; n). Thus, these unstable
solutions are only determined by the value of h′′.
This system exhibits three different types of behavior as K
is increased, depending on the strengthh′′ of the self-dependent
component. Ifh′′ > h′′c then the system undergoes a continuous
order-disorder phase transition, which becomes a first-order
one if h′′c > h′′ > h′′f and disappears in the h′′f > h′′ case. The
critical noise level Kc of the phase transition decreases as h′′
decreases.
In the low-noise limit in one of the ordered structures ρ1 →
1 and ρ2 < ρi = ρ3 for 2 < i  n, while in the disordered
phase (if K > Kc or h′′ < h′′f ) ρ1 = ρ2 < ρi = ρ3, at least in
the high noise limit (K → ∞). Notice that a strong enough
negative h′′ field and high entropy can stabilize the disordered
phase even at low noise levels. A similar mechanism can be
utilized for high-entropy alloys [44–46], which are considered
a promising family of materials for several technical purposes.
One can easily determine the value of h′′f by comparing
the average values of the potential U the system has in
the predicted solutions if K → 0. In one of the ordered
states of the coordinated strategies (e.g., ρ1 = 1 and ρi =
0 for i > 1) U/N = 2 + 4h′′. On the other hand, in the
disordered state of the neutral strategies U/N = 0. Comparing
the average potential of the two competing ground states
yields that both of the ordered (homogeneous) states of the
coordinated strategies are equivalent stable ground states if
h′′ > h′′f = −1/2 (independently of the value of n); otherwise
the disordered arrangement of neutral strategies becomes the
ground state.
We have yet to find a similar analytic expression that
describes the strategy number dependence of h′′c . At the
same time the numerical evaluation of this dependence would
require extensive numerical calculations even in the MFA and
PA. Obtaining exact results is even more time consuming
due to the critical slowing down of Monte Carlo simulations
near the transition point. Determining h′′c as a function of the
strategy number n goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
As mentioned above, in the MFA the high-entropy sta-
tionary states of the system of A′′ depend only on the
self-dependent component and the strategy frequencies can
be given as
ρ1 = ρ2 = e
4h′′/K
2e4h′′/K + (n − 2) , (14)
ρi = 12e4h′′/K + (n − 2) for i > 2.
Notice that the sign of h′′ determines the numerical order
of these strategy frequencies and consequently their K → 0
limits: If h′′ is positive ρ1 → 1/2 and ρi → 0, whereas
for negative values of h′′, as neutral strategies become best
response options against neutral strategies, we find thatρ1 → 0
and ρi → 1/(n − 2).
By considering the Taylor series expansion of the thermo-
dynamic potential around these solutions we can determine
the critical temperature of continuous phase transitions. Thus
one can derive an implicit equation for Kc in the framework
of the MFA that takes the following form:
K (MF)c = 8ρ1
(
K (MF)c
) = 8e4h
′′/K (MF)c
2e4h′′/K (MF)c + (n − 2)
. (15)
In agreement with the traditional predictions of the MFAs, the
Taylor series expansion can also be used to justify that the
K dependence of the order parameter follows the well-known
behavior, i.e., |ρ1 − ρ2| ∝ (K (MFA)c − K)1/2 if the transition is
continuous and K → K (MFA)c from below.
The introduction of the symmetry-breaking self-dependent
component [given by A′ in Eq. (11)] can also lead to
the disappearance of the critical phase transition present in
evolutionary spatial elementary coordination games. In fact,
a phase transition can only remain present in such systems if
the self-dependent component is not too beneficial (h′ < h′c).
According to previous Monte Carlo simulations [14] for h′ =
0, the present system exhibits a first-order phase transition if
the number of strategies n is above a threshold value nth = 27.
In this case the first-order phase transition can be observed
for h′ < h′c  0. The MFA and PA, however, predict lower
threshold values in the number of strategies, quantitatively,
n
(MFA)
th = 6 and n(PA)th = 10.
In Fig. 2 the results of the MFA and PA illustrate clearly how
the critical phase transition is smoothed out in the presence of
h′ if the strategy number is below its threshold value. The
unperturbed elementary coordination game (h′ = 0) has two
equivalent ordered strategy arrangements if K → 0.
As mentioned above, this equivalence is broken if we
introduce an h′ = 0 field. The h′ > 0 case favors strategy 1.
Consequently, ρ1 is the highest among the strategy frequencies
in the stable state and it decreases monotonically and continu-
ously from 1 to 1/n as K is increased (see the dash-dotted lines
for both approximations). Also, ρ1 > ρi = ρ3 > ρ2 (i > 3) at
all noise levels, which is different from the h′ = 0 game, where
strategy 2’s frequency is equal to strategy 1’s, both of which
exceed the equal frequencies of the neutral strategies. At the
PA level we have also found unstable states that only exist
at low enough noise levels and also exhibit some unexpected
behavior. In these states strategy 2 has the highest frequency
and ρ2 goes to 1 as K is decreased to 0 but it is not a monotonic
function of the noise level:ρ2 briefly increases close to the right
edge of its domain. The thin orange (light gray) lines of Fig. 2
correspond to the strategy frequencies of one such unstable
state.
An h′ < 0 system has very similar properties (for an
example see the dashed lines in Fig. 2), with a few differences.
In this case the choice of strategy 1 is penalized, which
essentially reverses the roles of the two coordinated strategies
in comparison with positive h′ games. This means that ρ2 >
ρi = ρ3 > ρ1 (again i > 3), the phase transition is smoothed
out, strategy 2’s frequency monotonically decreases to 1/n
in the K → ∞ limit, and even the unstable states in the PA
are similar. However, the frequency of the neutral strategies
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FIG. 2. Predictions of the (a) MFA and (b) PA for the strategy
frequencies vs K for n = 5 and h′ = −1/3 [blue (dark gray) lines],
h′ = 0 [green (medium gray) lines], and h′ = 1/3 [orange (light gray)
lines] if the payoff matrix is defined by Eq. (11). Dash-dotted lines
correspond to neutral strategies and solid and dashed lines represent
the frequencies of strategies 1 and 2, respectively. Thick and thin lines
denote stable and unstable states, respectively.
is not a monotonic function of the noise level anymore: At a
finite value of K it rises above its K → ∞ limit of 1/n, which
implies the existence of an inflection.
In contrast to the examples above, the first-order phase
transition can still be observed as it is demonstrated in Fig. 3 for
n = 20. For such a high value ofn the MFA and PA both predict
a first-order phase transition for h′ = 0 [see the solid lines in
Figs. 3(a) and 3(b)] and these transitions remain present for
all h′ below a positive h′c. The preferred coordinated strategy
forms a homogeneous state in the low noise limit. As K is
increased this strategy’s frequency starts to decrease and at Kc
it abruptly drops and then goes to 1/n as K is further increased,
as the dashed lines show in Fig. 3. Our numerical data indicate
that the value of h′ (as long as it remains below its critical
h′c strength) only very slightly affects the critical noise level
of the first-order transition. Nonzero fields also change the
character of the transition. If h′ = 0 the transition occurs due
to the competition of two distinct states, a low-entropy and a
high-entropy one. On the other hand, for finite h′ the low- and
high-temperature stable states are described by two branches
FIG. 3. Strategy frequencies as a function of K for n = 20 and
h′ = −1/3, 0, and 1/3 [plotted with blue (dark gray), green (medium
gray), and orange (light gray) lines, respectively] in the model defined
by Eq. (11). Solid (strategy 1) and dashed (strategy 2) lines belong
to the two coordinated strategies and the dash-dotted lines represent
neutral strategies. The lines correspond to the (a) MFA and (b) PA
solutions, with thick and thin lines denoting stable and unstable states,
respectively, as in Figs. 1 and 2. The vertical lines indicate first-order
phase transitions.
of continuous multivariable strategy frequency functions. An
example is plotted with dashed lines in Fig. 3. Above Kc the
higher-entropy branch’s thermodynamic potential becomes the
highest and this is reflected in the presence of the first-order
transition. In the presence of a strong enough positive h′ field
the phase transition is still abolished and the system behaves
like the lower-n positive-h′ games discussed previously.
IV. THREE-STRATEGY EQUIVALENTS OF ELEMENTARY
COORDINATION GAMES
The observations of Sec. III clearly suggest a similarity
between the increase of n for the absence of self-dependent
components and the variation of the strengths of self-
dependent components for n = 3. For both cases the system
is well characterized by the strategy frequencies ρ1 and ρ2
because the third or all the other neutral strategy frequencies
are defined by the conditions
∑n
i=1 ρi = 1 and ρi = ρ3 if
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i  3. Indeed, we can find a direct connection between these
two sets of games, at least at the level of the MFA.
Let us first consider the spatial game defined by A =
d(1,2; n). In the MFA the specific thermodynamic potential
of this system can be written as
1
N
(MF)(n) = 2(ρ1 − ρ2)2
−K
[
ρ1 ln ρ1 + ρ2 ln ρ2
+ (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) ln 1 − ρ1 − ρ2
n − 2
]
. (16)
Now we turn our attention to the game defined by Eq. (12)
for n = 3. In this case the above formula for n = 3 is
extended by the contribution of the average potential of the
self-dependent term, thus
1
N
′′(MF)(3) = 2(ρ1 − ρ2)2 + 4h′′(ρ1 + ρ2)
−K[ρ1 ln ρ1 + ρ2 ln ρ2
+ (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) ln (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)]. (17)
Disregarding a constant, the ρ1 and ρ2 dependences of
(MF)(n) and ′′(MF)(3) coincide if
h′′n = −
ln (n − 2)
4
K. (18)
One way to interpret this result is that virtual neutral strate-
gies can be simulated in a three-strategy (two coordinated
strategies and one neutral strategy) system by introducing a
noise-level-dependent self-dependent component of strength
h′′n that retains the symmetries. One can also think of this
noise-level-dependent game component as a substitute for the
excess entropy arising from the distinctiveness of n − 2 neutral
strategies.
On the square lattice the above MFAs predict an equivalent
K dependence for the games with payoffs A = d(1,2; n) and
A′′ defined by (12) for n = 3 and
A′′′ = d(1,2; 3) − h′′ne(3,3) (19)
if the K-dependent h′′n is given by Eq. (18). Notice that the
second and third systems can be mapped onto each other by
adding a suitable constant to each matrix component.
Surprisingly, the predicted equivalence remains valid on
the square lattice as indicated by Monte Carlo simulations for
n = 6 in Fig. 4. For the plotted data the statistical errors are
smaller than the symbol size, except the close vicinity of the
transition point.
The quantitative analysis of all the possible transition
probabilities given by Eq. (4) has justified that one can
merge the n − 2 interchangeable neutral strategies into a
single neutral state by introducing an effective three-strategy
game that has the same potential. The detailed discussion of
this calculation goes beyond the scope of the present work
because the evolution into a given Boltzmann distribution is
not affected by adding arbitrary cross-dependent components
to the pair interactions. Furthermore, the uniform logit rule (4)
can also be individualized in different ways, preserving the
detailed balance in the Boltzmann distribution [8].
FIG. 4. Monte Carlo simulations on the square lattice show an
equivalent K dependence in the strategy frequencies when comparing
the six-strategy systems with a pair interaction d(1,2; 6) (crosses)
and its three-strategy equivalent (circles) given by Eq. (19). The
frequencies of the four neutral strategies (for n = 6) are merged into
one to illustrate the agreement.
V. SUMMARY
In this paper we discussed a special subset of general
n-strategy evolutionary potential games governed by the logit
rule on a square lattice. These games are linear combinations
of elementary coordination games (defining a coordinated
strategy pair and neutral strategies) and certain self-dependent
games. When summarizing the general features of the set of
coordination games we found a method for determining the
strength of each elementary coordination component that is
not orthogonal to all the others. This simple method exploits
the fact that the corresponding elementary games are described
by sparse matrices.
Most of our results were obtained by using the MFA and
PA methods. Cursory Monte Carlo simulations indicate that
these methods give qualitatively correct predictions of the
macroscopic behavior and properties of the games in question.
Elementary coordination games exhibit either a first-order
or a continuous phase transition depending on the number of
strategies. Our paper focuses on how this feature is modified by
the addition of self-dependent game components that preserve
the interchangeability of neutral strategies.
Adding a self-dependent component that retains the sym-
metry of neutral strategies but breaks the symmetry of the
active strategies can have two consequences. First-order phase
transitions, which are present if the number of strategies
exceeds a threshold value, are preserved if the external field is
not too strong. Otherwise the phase transitions are smoothed
out. In both cases the preferred coordinated strategy forms a
homogeneous ordered state in the zero noise limit.
The introduction of the other (symmetry-retaining and
self-dependent) component has more possible outcomes. The
strength of this component determines the order, and possibly
even the presence, of the phase transition in these systems.
If the external field’s strength h′′ is below h′′f = −1/2 the
system’s disordered high-entropy state becomes stabilized
at all noise levels and no phase transitions are observed.
In the h′′f < h′′ < h′′c range a first-order phase transition
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appears that separates a low-entropy ordered state and a
high-entropy disordered state. For h′′c < h′′ this transition
becomes continuous. The critical noise level of the transition
increases with the field strength.
The three-strategy version of these games gives an oppor-
tunity to virtually simulate n-strategy elementary coordination
games. By introducing an appropriate noise-level-dependent
external field affecting the third strategy we can substitute
the excess entropy of the additional neutral strategies of an
n-strategy elementary coordination game. This effectively
bunches n − 2 equivalent but distinguishable strategies into
one anomalous strategy with noise-level-dependent payoffs.
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